While the GOP has made gains in the 1980s, this trend need not continue. The fortunes of the parties have had peaks and valleys over the last 50 years. In 1964, for instance, the GOP appeared to be retreating on nearly all fronts. Yet by 1968, the GOP had won the White House and had also made sizable inroads into the Democrat's edge in self-identified partisans. Such shifts suggest that we should be cautious when interpreting the recent changes in the public's attitudes toward the parties. Caution may be particularly appropriate in this case, given that the Democrats retain a plurality of self-identified partisans, control both houses of Congress, and hold a majority of governorships and legislatures in the fifty states.
To detect the depth of the GOP's gains and thereby develop a better sense of the relative standing of the two parties, I examine changes in the public's evaluations of Democratic and Republican parties since 1952. This examination does not include the public's assessment of presidential contenders. By setting aside attitudes toward the two nominees, one avoids contaminating the estimates of partisan support in the electorate. It is possible, for instance, that the gains by the GOP in recent years are tied, in part, to Reagan's personal popularity rather than any enduring change in how the public evaluates the two parties. Thus, by limiting attention to just the public's evaluation of the parties, one can better estimate the underlying support for the parties in the electorate.
To generate these estimates of "underlying support," I first examine shifts in the citizenry's overall evaluation of the parties, and second, and more important, I examine the changes in the public's evaluation of particular issues that make up these broader assessments. Thus, for instance, do citizens view the Democrats or GOP more favorably on such matters as the economy, foreign policy, or race relations? And has the Democratic (or Republican) lead on these issues expanded or contracted over the last ten years?
The Evidence
To measure change in the public's partisan evaluations, I rely on the National Election Studies' (NES) open-ended questions on the likes/ dislikes of the two parties. The actual wording of these questions is: Building on these earlier works, I developed a coding scheme to examine the following sets of concerns: the economy; foreign policy; race relations; social-welfare matters; political philosophy; concerns about big business and labor; the management of government; and "contemporary" issues, which include references to crime, drugs, busing, abortion, gun control, and women's rights (see the appendix for details about the coding).3 These issues, obviously, are only a subset of all possible concerns. But they cover many of the major disputes facing parties and should shed light on how the public evaluates the parties.
Estimating the Influence of Issues
To determine the impact of an issue on how the electorate evaluates the parties, we must first determine its salience and then estimate whether the public views one party more favorably than the other on that issue. Fortunately, Kelley (1983) provides a way to estimate the salience and the partisan bias of issues using the NES's open-ended questions. According to Kelley, salience is simply the proportion of respondents "who cite a given issue as something to like or dislike about the major parties . . ." (1983, 61).4 Bias, on the other hand, is the proportion of citizens who favor one of the parties on a particular issue. To estimate bias, one first subtracts the pro-Republican comments from the pro-Democratic comments for that particular issue.5 The result is a scale that can range from + 10, a highly Democratic score, to -10, a highly Republican score. With this measure, one then divides the number of respondents who favor one party by all respondents who favor either party on that issue, yielding what Kelley calls bias (see Kelley 1983, 60-64) .
With measures of salience and bias, one can then calculate the partisan influence of an issue. Here, I want to introduce a new concept, 
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John G. Geer Net Pull, the relative ability of the two parties to attract supporters on a given issue. To determine the pull of an issue for a party, one multiplies the bias for a party by its salience. The result is the "proportion of . . . respondents who see a given issue as favoring a given . . . party" (Kelley 1983, 61) . One then calculates the pull of any issue for both parties, subtracting the two proportions to yield the Net Pull. The specific formula is:
Net Pull = (salience of an issue x Democratic bias on that issue) -(salience of an issue x Republican bias on that issue)
Estimates of pull for both parties are necessary, since highly salient issues may have a lot of pull for each party. For example, an issue that is salient to the public with a Democratic bias of 60% will still help the Republicans gain a more positive evaluation among the 40% who see the issue favoring the GOP. Therefore, looking only at the pull for one party provides a misleading picture of the overall influence of that issue on the electorate's partisan evaluations. Net Pull avoids this problem by providing direct insight into how an issue yielded change in the net partisan evaluations of the electorate. A useful way to think about this concept is that it estimates the lead one party has over the other on a particular issue.
One final methodological task involves estimating the public's overall evaluation of the two parties. Here I shall follow a simple procedure first adopted by Stokes, Campbell, and Miller (1958) : namely, summing all the respondents' likes and dislikes of the two parties. This summation is used to generate three indicators of party support. First, "net Republican score" indicates the proportion of respondents who made more pro-Republican comments than pro-Democratic comments. "Net Democratic score," as one might guess, is just the reverse. "Neutrals," on the other hand, are those citizens who made no comments about either party or who made an equal number of pro-Democratic and pro-Republican comments. Table 1 reports the public's overall partisan assessments from 1952 to 1988. One obvious pattern in table 1 is that, from 1968 to 1980, the proportion of neutrals nearly doubled. This trend, which Wattenberg (1990) has carefully documented, suggests that both parties were further away from majority status in the 1980s than they were in the 1950s. My purpose, however, is to examine the shifts in the electorate's relative assessment of the parties, which is well summarized by the net Democratic edge. Here, the results suggest that the GOP has Salience is the proportion of respondents who made at least one comment about the issue. Dem bias is the proportion of respondents who see an issue favoring the Democrats. The Republican bias equals 100% minus the Democratic bias. Neutrals are excluded from this calculation. Net pull is the proportion of respondents "pulled" by the issue toward a particular party. A negative sign means the pull is toward the Republican party. Pull is arrived at by multiplying salience by bias for the party. studied here has had such a powerful effect on the public's assessment of the parties. Interestingly, one foundation of the New Deal was that the Democrats were the party of the working man and woman, and that image appears to remain a centerpiece of the citizens' partisan evaluations-even 50 years after FDR set the New Deal in motion.
The Findings
While the Democrats benefit greatly from that issue, other concerns One potentially important change in favor of the GOP does, however, emerge on the economic front. Since 1980, the public has begun to view the GOP more favorably on matters pertaining to the economy. In 1976, for instance, the Democratic bias was 66%. By 1988, it had slipped to 39%, yielding a net pull of 9% for the Republicans. It appears that Carter's economic difficulties combined with Reagan's economic successes have led the public to think of the Republicans as the "party of prosperity." And since economic issues are often salient when citizens evaluate the parties, this change bodes well for the GOP.
The two remaining concerns, "contemporary" and racial issues, have simply not been salient enough to generate significant change in the public's evaluation of the parties. The low salience of "contemporary" issues has led to net pulls of just -1% in three of the last five elections. Racial issues follow a similar pattern. Between 1972 and 1988, only about 2% to 3% of the electorate made any references to racial concerns. With such low salience, these issues have been unable to recast the electorate's partisan evaluations. The only exception was 1964, when racial matters were salient to 15% of the public. But in that year the Democratic bias was just 54%, leading to a small overall impact for those concerns. The data in table 3, however, lend little support to the interpretation that the GOP has built a favorable impression among the youth of the 1980s. In each of the last three presidential elections, these citizens have favored the Democratic party. The Democratic edge ranged from 2 percentage points in 1980 to 12 percentage points in 1984. These young citizens do, however, tend to be more neutral in their assessment of parties than the entire public, suggesting that neither party has captured their imaginations. But even though these 18-29-year-olds have less to say about the parties, the partisan content of their responses is similar to that of the entire electorate (see table 4). Comments about labor and big business, for example, strongly favor the Democrats. For social welfare concerns, the Democrats maintained a small edge in net pull in 1984 and 1988, again indicating that, among these newest voters, there has not been a widespread rejection of the Democrats' position on social spending. On economic issues, the GOP holds a lead comparable to its lead among the entire electorate. All in all, it would be difficult to argue that the newest members of the electorate will provide a foothold for the GOP as it strives to become the majority party.
Conclusion
These results show that the Democratic party, despite recent defeats in presidential elections, remains the favored party. The Democratic edge in the public's overall partisan evaluations is about the same in 1989). These data may underestimate the influence of racial issues, especially since respondents may be hesitant to mention these concerns for fear of saying something socially unacceptable. This argument surely has merit, but there may be more to the story. In 1964, for instance, the salience of racial concerns rose to 15%, suggesting that a good number of citizens were willing to mention this matter in some situations. In addition, the proportion of citizens citing racial concerns has dropped since 1964, suggesting that racial issues are less salient to the public's partisan evaluations in the 1980s than they were in the 1960s. the 1980s as it was in the 1950s. In addition, the electorate's relative evaluation of the Democrats and Republicans on seven of the eight issues studied here have not changed greatly over the last 20 years. The Democrats continue to benefit greatly from concerns associated with big business and labor and also remain ahead on social-welfare matters. The only significant change occurs for economic issues, where the GOP have built a lead over the Democrats in recent years. Finally, the youth of the nation do not appear to be pro-Republican in their evaluations of the parties, suggesting that generational change may not lead to a GOP majority. These data, in sum, suggest that continuity, rather than change, is an important theme underlying the public's relative evaluations of the parties from 1952 to 1988. This analysis also has more general lessons for the study of partisan change. Specifically, the idea that issues pull and tug on citizens' overall evaluations of parties highlight the many obstacles that face the minority party's climb to the top. First, table 2 shows that few issues have had great impact on the overall partisan evaluations of the electorate. Except for concerns about big business and labor, no issue has had an average net pull of more than 10% during the 36-year period. It makes sense that most issues will be salient to only a portion of the population, especially given the diversity of the U.S. electorate. But because of this diversity, most issues simply lack the power to reshape the partisan moorings of the entire electorate.
A second obstacle is that many issues confront the public at any one time-each tugging and pulling on the citizens' overall evaluations of the parties. The economic growth during the Reagan administration, for instance, has surely given many young voters reason to support the Republicans. But simultaneously, other positions of the GOP, such as those on social-welfare issues, may be retarding partisan change toward them. Since there is this pull-and-tug effect and few issues have widespread salience, it becomes clearer why it has been over 50 years since a new majority party emerged. The forces associated with lowsalience issues can only chip away at the partisan evaluations of the electorate. This argument strongly suggests that permanent, large-scale shifts in the overall partisan evaluations of the public may be impossible without both a highly salient issue that dominates the concerns of most citizens and an issue that is perceived by the public as heavily favoring one party-just as Sundquist (1983) 
